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Abstract In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a
methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science.
Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the
‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibil-
ity hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and
empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several
strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying indi-
vidual decision making, compared to a multiple-agent approach which Ross promotes.
I argue that the debate between economists and psychologists are both theoretical and
empirical, but cannot be resolved by appealing to the ideal of unification.
Keywords Unification · Ad hocness · Economics and psychology ·
Preference reversals · The compatibility hypothesis · Multiple-agent models ·
Procedural models
1 Introduction
Philosophical theories of explanation, causation, measurement and so on are often
abstracted from historical case studies of past developments of mature science. But
conceptual analyses of this sort are also expected to play some normative or regulative
role in contemporary science (unless one is committed to the particular philosophi-
cal view that the rational reconstruction of past scientific theories has no implication
for contemporary scientific practice). This study concerns one of the normative func-
tions of the concept of unification, namely to provide us with some principled way
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of appraising competing hypotheses when the relevant scientific communities cannot
reach a consensus based on the available empirical evidence. A debate in contempo-
rary economics supplies a good case: in the last forty years or so, Expected Utility
Theory (EUT), one of the most prominent theories of how individuals make choices
under risk and uncertainty, has been tested extensively both in the laboratory and in
field experiments. Although the rigorous and systematic tests of EUT have accumu-
lated persistent anomalous observations, there is little consensus among researchers,
in particular between economists and psychologists, as to how to explain the data.
Do the data refute the theory? And if so, how should we modify it? Or should we
rather abandon it and come up with something different altogether? Or is there still
room to argue that the data are an experimental artefact and that therefore the theory is
untouched? The present study’s main focus, Don Ross’s monograph Economic Theory
and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation (2005), proposes an answer that is original
in at least two respects. First, Ross does not follow the ‘explaining away’ strategy
common in economics, which (i) questions the external or ‘ecological’ validity of the
experimental results and (ii) suggests that people’s choice behaviour will conform
to the standard EUT model once they make ‘real’ choices in economic contexts. On
the contrary, Ross accepts the experimental results as a serious challenge to EUT.
Second, however, he insists that “a separate economic science” (Ross 2005, p. 180)
provides a better explanation than those proposed by the psychological ‘heuristics and
biases’ programme and promoted by some behavioural economists. Ross’s argument
for a separated economic science crucially depends on accepting the methodological
requirement that explanation be unification.1 This makes Ross (2005) an interesting
case, in which a normative role of the concept developed by historians and philosophers
of science is tested in a contemporary scientific debate.2 Through this case study, I will
show that unificationism cannot settle this particular debate. The main reason is that
Ross’s rival, the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme (more specifically the compatibil-
ity hypothesis, which I shall examine in detail), is not ‘Ptolemaic’ (non-unificatory)
in any sense. Although my case does not constitute a genuine counter-example to
unificationism (in which some explanation is better yet less unifying), it conveys a
sense of the limited role of unification in decision science, with an emphasis on some
intricate theoretical and empirical aspects of the debate.
As will become clear later in the study, I am, roughly speaking, critical of EUT-based
explanations and friendly to their rivals. The readers, however, should not interpret
my theoretical preference as implying a naïve and unproductive dichotomy between
economics and psychology; rather, I hope to suggest a more nuanced picture of two
alternative models of cognitive processes underlying individual decision making: the
multiple-self model and the procedural model.
The study proceeds as follows: first, I analyze the unificationist account advanced
by Ross (2005), drawing on a Lakatosian framework (Sect. 2). As a background,
1 I should note that unificationism is only one aspect of Ross (2005), which contains other stimulating
methodological and substantial theses that are worth analyzing.
2 Gintis (2009) also argues for unifying the social sciences with, among others, game theory. However
Gintis’s concept of unification emphasizes the consistency of different disciplines and thereby differs from
the one that developed in the philosophy of science.
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I will introduce the multiple-agent model, an economic model of inter-temporal choice,
and show that the appeal to this model in explaining intra-temporal choice such as
PRs, suggests that Ross (2005) is a Lakatosian unificationist. In the following four
sections I will evaluate Ross’s application of unificatioinism to behavioural decision
research. First, I will assess, at the methodological level, Ross’s charge that the ‘heu-
ristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc, or ‘Ptolemaic’ (Sect. 3). I will then extend the
assessment by looking in detail at a specific hypothesis that Ross criticizes, namely,
the compatibility hypothesis (Sect. 4). Based on this assessment, I will argue that the
compatibility hypothesis is not ad hoc in any sense; on the contrary, it points towards
what I call a ‘procedural model’, an explanatory psychological model that, both on
empirical and theoretical grounds, is at least as well-motivated as the multiple-agent
model (Sect. 5). Finally, I will compare these two models, taking into account some
recent neuroscientific evidence (Sect. 6). Section 7 summarizes the argument and
concludes.
2 The unificationist approach to theory appraisal
Perhaps Kitcher (1981) is the best known account of scientific explanation as uni-
fication. Roughly put, Kitcher’s unificationism is the thesis that scientific explana-
tion should derive descriptions of more phenomena from fewer patterns of argument.
Without going into the details of Kitcher’s formal characterization of the concept of
an argument pattern, one can intuitively grasp the gist of this account by example: if
EUT allows us to derive the description of people’s choices of mates as well as goods
and services in terms of expected utility maximization, then it is more unificatory than
a theory that allows us to derive only the description of the latter type of choices in
terms of some utility maximization, while explaining the former type of choices using
some other principle. Lakatos (1970) explicates a similar idea in terms of the concept
of progress: a scientific hypothesis is progressive if it not only successfully predicts
novel facts, but does so while maintaining certain ‘core’ theoretical features. Lakatos
calls such a continuous explanatory enterprise a research programme (more on this
below). What is common in these two accounts is the intuition that a hypothesis should
not be ad hoc, but while Kitcher emphasizes the synchronic, logical aspects of unifi-
cation, Lakatos looks at its diachronic, historical aspects. Although Lakatos himself
does not use the term ‘unificationism’ to characterize his position, in the following
discussion I will mainly draw on Lakatos’s diachronic formulation of unificationism.
I do this for two reasons: first, Lakatos, but not Kitcher, supplies a well-worked-out
account of ad hocness. Second, such an account is necessary for the analysis of Ross
(2005) position, which, although he calls it ‘Kitcherian’ (p. 176), heavily relies on the
concept of ad hocness.
Preference theory states that a decision maker’s preference ordering should not
change over an identical set of options. Although we could say in general that, in
violating this presupposition, the decision maker reversed her preferences, the term
preference reversal (PR) is reserved for a narrower class of reversals in which the
decision maker’s preference over a pair of options is reversed, depending on how we
elicit her preference. For example, if Anne says she would price a banana at £1 and
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an apple at £2, and yet chooses the banana rather than the apple when both are free,
we say that her choice behaviour manifests a preference reversal: the decision maker
manifested inconsistent preferences, depending on the way in which they were elicited
(pricing or choosing). In the past forty years of behavioural decision research, PR has
established its status as an ‘anomaly’ in relation to EUT. An ‘anomaly’ in a research
programme is, according to Lakatos, “a phenomenon which we regard as something
to be explained in terms of the programme” (1970, p. 159, fn.1). In other words, being
an anomaly is a relational status vis-à-vis particular research programmes. The sta-
tus of an anomaly therefore may change as these programmes advance: generally, in
relation to programme P1, an anomaly turns into an ‘example’ when explained within
the theoretical framework of P1; it ‘disappears’ when independently explained by
another programme, P∗; or it becomes a ‘counterexample’ when explained by P1’s
rival programme, P2 ( ibid.). To say that PRs constitute a class of anomalies thus means
that at least one research programme is involved in this process. In the present case,
there are two programmes involved; one is the psychological ‘heuristics and biases’
approach advanced by the psychologists Kahneman, Tversky and Slovic, among oth-
ers. The other is the economic approach characterized by its insistence that human
decision making be modelled as utility maximization.3 PRs are a class of anomalies in
relation to the economic programme (P1), while a rival programme, the psychological
programme (P2) purports to explain it. And yet there is no universal agreement among
researchers that the psychological programme satisfactorily explains PRs, thereby
leaving the phenomenon (in some sense) anomalous to both programmes. Instead of
evaluating the competing hypotheses based on the available evidence, I shall focus on
assessing whether methodological considerations regarding unification alone can say
something in favour of the economic programme. I shall argue, contra Ross (2005),
one of the main advocates of the unificationist approach in economics and cognitive
science, that it cannot. First, I will describe the contrast Ross makes between ‘Ptol-
emaic’ (ad hoc) and ‘non-Ptolemaic’ (unificatory) science, and then, by illustrating
Ross’s favourite case, inter-temporal decision making, I will clarify how the debate
concerning PRs can be interpreted according to this contrast.
2.1 ‘Ptolemaic’ science and ad hocness
Ross (2005) uses the adjective ‘Ptolemaic’ to refer to a research programme which
relies on an ‘ad hoc’ explanation in order to accommodate anomalies. But what exactly
does ‘ad hoc’ mean? Lakatos (1970, p. 175, fns. 2, 3) distinguishes three senses of
ad hocness: an explanation is ad hoc1 if it does not predict any novel facts (no excess
content); it is ad hoc2 if it predicts novel facts but fails; it is ad hoc3 if it predicts novel
facts and is corroborated by evidence, but its progress is not led by a general outline
of the programme regarding how to accommodate anomalies (the positive heuristic).
It seems that Ross has in mind ad hoc3 when he says some programme is ‘Ptole-
3 The distinction between the ‘psychological’ and the ‘economic’ is not sharp. In fact, Tversky and Kahn-
eman’s Prospect Theory is a model of utility maximization and so, in this specific sense, it is ‘economic’.
See Sect. 5 for a more nuanced distinction.
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maic’: a ‘Ptolemaic’ programme “must sooner or later reach a point of diminishing
returns, where the effort required to further improve careful models can no longer
be justified by gains in representational parsimony” (Ross 2005, p. 176).4 To use a
Lakatosian term, ‘Ptolemaic’ programmes are degenerating rather than progressive.
Although Ross recognizes that ‘Ptolemaic’ phases in science are unavoidable as a pro-
cess of systematically summarizing data5 and can be instrumental in future theoretical
progress, Ross, just like Lakatos, further requires that a promising programme should
have some principled way of unifying existing data. In Ross (2005, p. 175) own words,
‘non-Ptolemaic’ science ought to be motivated by “wider theoretical considerations”
independent of the data it seeks to parsimoniously summarize.
In explaining PRs, however, what constitutes such a unifying principle is not quite
clear. As it turns, out, as a ‘non-Ptolemaic’ strategy Ross has in mind what Lakatos
calls a ‘creative shift’ (Lakatos 1970, p. 137) in the positive heuristic of a research
programme. In Ross’s construal, the negative heuristic of the economic programme—
which defines the irrefutable ‘hardcore’—requires that an agent’s behaviour be
modelled as maximization of utility defined as indices of consistent and stable prefer-
ence orderings (preference theory);6 in addition, the positive heuristic tells research-
ers how to accommodate evidence within the framework of the programme. In the
economic programme, the content of preferences is completely unspecified, thereby
enabling the programme to be applicable to a large set of behavioural patterns.7 How-
ever, PRs are regarded as a serious anomaly to the economic programme because
the phenomenon apparently challenges one of its hardcore assumptions that pref-
erences be consistent in the sense that they conform to the axioms of EUT or its
variants. Now, Ross’s creative shift is to hypothesize that not only the content of
preferences but also the agents, who act upon preferences, are unspecified. More spe-
cifically, he proposes an auxiliary hypothesis that the economic agents characterized
with their utility maximizing behaviour are not individual human beings but parts
of individuals. In other words, individuals can consist of more than one economic
agent. With this shift, an individual’s behaviour exhibiting PRs may be interpreted as
resulting from the combination of more than one preference ordering per agent. In
this way, the hard core of the preference-based programme may be saved from the
refutation and the anomaly turned into an example manifesting the fruitfulness of the
programme.
In what follows, I will explain several models of inter-temporal choice, including
one that motivates Ross (2005) to advocate the multiple-self model in the domain of
intra-temporal choice, in which PRs emerges as an anomaly.
4 If non-parsimonious theories are inferior to parsimonious ones in predictive power, then Ross’s ‘Ptole-
maic’ programme is ad hoc2 as well as ad hoc3.
5 Lakatos makes the same point by noting that ad hoc3 explanations are at least empirically corroborated.
6 Ross identifies this hardcore with Revealed Preference Theory (RPT) advocated by Paul Samuelson.
While many economists would agree with this, the interpretation of RPT itself is contested.
7 There is a common but essentially unfounded worry that the ‘thin’ interpretation of preferences makes
the economic programme tautological or empirically vacuous. For a good discussion see Guala (2006), and
his footnotes 22, 39 and 40 for the relevant literature.
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2.2 A case of inter-temporal choice: the departure from the standard model
of discounted utility
A contemporary version of the idea that an individual consists of more than one ‘self’
has been developed by the American psychiatrist George Ainslie since the 1970s in
the context of inter-temporal choice. In the following, I will first introduce its rival,
the received model, whose empirical inadequacy led Ainslie and others to propose
alternative models of inter-temporal choice.
The standard model, called the discounted utility model (DUM), was originally
formulated by Paul Samuelson in 1937.8 DUM represents people’s choices between
consumption bundles across different times by flattening all the relevant psychological
factors into the single parameter of a discount rate. Mathematically, DUM represents
the utility at the time t of the consumption profile (ct , ct+1, ct+2, · · · , cT ), starting
in period t and continuing until period T , as an inter-temporal utility function defined
as follows:
U t (ct , . . . , cT ) =
∑
[k = 0 → T − t]D(k) u(ct+k)
where D(k) = (1/1 + ρ)k
The function u(ct+k) can be interpreted as an individual’s instantaneous utility
function, representing her perceived wellbeing in period t + k. The other function
appearing on the right hand side of the equation, D(k), is her discount function, rep-
resenting the relative weight she attaches in time period t to her wellbeing in period
t + k. The parameter in this function, ρ, refers to her discount rate, representing the
rate at which the individual discounts future utilities. For example, Anne’s utility from
receiving her annual salary of £32,000 for three continuous years may be calculated
as follows, if the utility from each year’s income is always x and if the discount rate
is 10%:
U t (£32,000, £32,000, £32,000)
= x/(1 + 0.1) + x/(1 + 0.1)2 + x/(1 + 0.1)3  2.45x
In the present context, it is essential to notice three features of DUM. First, DUM
assumes that people use the same discount rate, ρ, over their lifespan (stationary
discounting). This means, for example, that Anne discounts her £32,000 by 10% at
any year t , regardless of whether she is a teenager, middle-aged, or retired. Second,
DUM assumes that at any period of time the same discounting by the exponential k
is applied to all future periods (constant discounting). Third, these two assumptions
of stationary and constant discounting ensure that people’s preferences do not change
over time (time-consistent preferences).
Not only is DUM introspectively unrealistic and counter-intuitive, but also it has
been shown to be inadequate as a model of actual people’s choice behaviour both in
8 The summary in this section is based on Wilkinson (2008, Chaps. 5 and 6). Wilkinson emphasizes that
Samuelson believed neither in the empirical nor in the normative validity of this model.
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Fig. 1 Exponential discount curves from a smaller-sooner (SS) and a larger-later (LL) reward (a) contrasted
with hyperbolic discount curves from an SS and an LL reward (b) (from Ainslie 2005, p. 636)
the field and in laboratory experiments. For example, ρ is known to decrease as people
enter middle age, but increase again as they get older (Read and Read 2004; Harrison
et al. 2002). The unavoidable implication of this and other observations is that people’s
preferences are not consistent over time. This, however, does not mean that modelling
inter-temporal choice is impossible; it is still possible to represent time-inconsistent
choices by using some other discount function. In fact, various such models have been
proposed. The most famous one is called the hyperbolic discount function, whose
development Ainslie (e.g., 1991) contributed to. Let ut be the instantaneous utility
an agent gets at time t . In a discrete-time form, a hyperbolic, or ‘quasi-hyperbolic’
discount function is then represented as follows:9
U t (ut , ut+1, . . . , uT ) = (δ)t ut + β
∑
[τ = t + 1 → T ](δ)τ uτ
where δ and β are parameters less than 1, with δ very close to 1. If β = 1, the hyper-
bolic utility function reduces to the exponential function. Figure 1 graphically contrasts
these two types of discounting.
In Fig. 1b, but not in a, the smaller reward is temporarily preferred just before it
becomes available, which is shown by the curve of the smaller reward crossing that of
the larger one from below. Although hyperbolic discount functions may be seen as a
mere technical adjustment to the exponential function, adopting such models inevita-
bly raises a difficult question of consciousness or self-awareness about inconsistencies
9 I gloss over the mathematical details and use the terms ‘hyperbolic’ and ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ interchange-
ably.
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on the part of individual actors. In order to understand this point, imagine the following
scenario: Anne purchased two packs of her favourite giant chocolate toffee cookies
from Tesco because they were on a ‘buy-one-get-one-free’ discount. But she knows
that eating too much of them can cause health problems that she would like to avoid.
So at the time of purchase (t = 1) she decided to eat one pack per week, her usual
quota. Now the first chance to eat the cookies (t = 2) arrives. Quickly finishing one
pack, Anne glances at the second one on the shelf, reaches down and eats it all. One of
her housemates, Alex, who happens to be a devoted follower of DUM, enters the room
and says, “Your preferences are inconsistent, Anne! At time 1 you preferred eating
one pack per week to two per week, because of your concern for health. But now, at
time 2, you prefer to eat two! If I remember correctly, you bought two packs to get a
discount, not to eat them all at once.” What would Anne’s reply be? I predict that most
people would feel uneasy with the following answer: “Sure, Alex, my preferences
are indeed time-inconsistent. But what’s wrong with them? My discount function is
hyperbolic, not exponential like yours!” The oddity of this answer comes from the fact
that hyperbolic functions may describe your inconsistent behaviour but cannot capture
the psychological fact that you are aware of your preference at t = 1 and that you still
see that preference as reasonable at t = 2. People are in fact usually aware of their past
preferences; in this imaginary case Anne would also see the reasonableness of her past
preference. One might object that the individual’s self-awareness is irrelevant for the
empirical issue of how the observer best models and explains behaviour, but the fact
that people often talk about their choices’ inter-temporal consistency in this kind of sit-
uation reminds us of an important empirical fact that people are capable of foreseeing
changes in their preferences and acting accordingly. For example, in an alternative sce-
nario, Anne may, as a means of self-command, choose to buy only one pack, forgoing
the chance of discount. Strotz (1955) labels a decision maker who accurately antici-
pates the future change in her preferences as a ‘sophisticated’, as opposed to a ‘naïve’
hyperbolic decision maker, who erroneously believes that her future preferences will
be identical to her current ones. It seems that most people lie somewhere in between
these two extreme cases. Wherever exactly people are located, it seems necessary to
rethink the rationale of the hyperbolic discount model, once such ‘internal conflict’ is
recognized as underlying mechanisms of time-inconsistent choices. Wilkinson (2008,
p. 236) thus suggests that the hyperbolic discounting approach lacks a psychological
foundation.10
In order to explain why people’s choice behaviour conforms to hyperbolic discount
utility functions, Ainslie and others have developed so called the ‘multiple-self model’.
In this model, ‘multiple-self’ refers to the existence within each person of several
agents defined by their own interests, or preference orderings. Typically, the short-term
‘self’ and the long-term ‘self’ are defined by their distinct preferences, e.g., indulging
10 This is not necessarily the case, however, once one recognizes the possibility of interpreting the hyper-
bolic discounting realistically (I thank Don Ross for suggesting this). Specifically, the hyperbolic discount
model may be interpreted realistically as representing distinctive mechanisms underlying individual inter-
temporal decision making, rather than a mere ‘curve-fitting’ adjustment to the exponential model. Such a
literal interpretation of a utility function is unusual not only for the exponential model, but for the economists’
general modelling strategy, which has minimal ontological commitment to the functional representation of
utilities.
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yourself with your favourite sweets vs. maintaining good health, respectively. There
are at least three reasons that lend some support to this idea. First, conceptually this
is a simple way to make sense of the common observation that we encounter self-
control problems: if self-control is a real phenomenon, then there must be at least
two ‘selves’, one controlling and the other being controlled. Singular utility models
cannot even make sense of there being an issue of self-control (Wilkinson 2008, p.
232). Second, although contested, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study of brain activities of decision makers suggests that choices between two delayed
rewards and choices between immediate and delayed rewards are associated with the
activity of distinct brain areas, namely, the lateral pre-frontal cortex and the limbic
system, respectively (McClure et al. 2004). This may be interpreted as suggesting that
models of conflicting ‘selves’ are not mere metaphors but may have some physical cor-
respondence at the neuro-physiological level. Finally, some models of multiple-selves
provide accurate predictions of time-inconsistent choices. Specifically, Ainslie (2001)
models interactions of short- and long-term interests as repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games, accurately predicting a set of various addictive behaviours. Fudenberg and
Levine (2006) also apply a dual-self model to predict not failure (such as addiction)
but success of self-control, i.e., non-pathological behaviour such as people’s strate-
gic limiting of pocket cash to prevent overspending later at a nightclub where their
preferences may change under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Ross (2005, p.
341) takes Ainslie’s results as “the principal source of [Ainslie’s model’s] empirical
persuasiveness”; further Ross suggests that a wider range of game models (assur-
ance, coordination, inspection games etc.) should be able to explain a wider range of
behavioural patterns resulting from interactions of different selves within the “sub-
personal marketplace”. Here, it is evident that Ross’s methodological justification of
the ‘non-Ptolemaic’ model comes not only from its empirical success—which even
ad hoc3 models may achieve—but also from its potential unifying power: with the cre-
ative shift of seeing a whole individual as a community of distinct economic agents,
it becomes possible to unify models of (both inter- and intra-temporal) individual
decision making using preference theory and game theory.
3 The assessment of the ‘ptolemaic’ critique as a methodological thesis
Does the success of the multiple-self model in the domain of inter-temporal choice
lend some support to adopting this model in the domain of intra-temporal decision
making? Ross (2005) seems to suggest that it does. In the following I will argue that
such unificationist considerations are not conclusive. This section concerns method-
ological aspects of unificationism, while Sects. 4 and 5 deal with empirical problems
with Ross’s (2005) unificationist approach.
Ross (2005) characterizes various attempts to model risky decision making as indi-
viduals’ utility maximization (EUT, Prospect Theory, Regret Theory, etc.) as ‘Ptol-
emaic’, or ad hoc3 in our Lakatosian terminology. That is, Ross regards these mod-
els as ultimately unable to explain all the relevant phenomena (including PRs) as
long as they take individuals as loci of maximization. This position is manifest when
Ross, in discussing the preference reversal phenomenon, criticizes the compatibility
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hypothesis proposed by psychologists and some behavioural economists. One version
of this hypothesis states that people, when evaluating options, attach greater weight
to information (or input stimuli) that are more compatible with output selection tasks
(see Sect. 4 for a more detailed analysis). Ross’s target is Tversky and Thaler (1990),
who employ this hypothesis to explain PRs. The main pattern of PRs is such that
people price low-probability high-payoff bets (L bets) higher than high-probability
low-payoff bets (H bets), while choosing the H bets rather than the L bets, making
the apparent ‘reversals’ of preferences in the two kinds of tasks. This pattern can be
explained in terms of compatibility bias because the information regarding price seems
to be weighted more in the pricing task, while in the choosing task there is no such
bias. Ross criticizes this interpretation for two reasons, one empirical and the other
theoretical. The empirical reason is simply that other experimental data (Loomes et al.
1991; Loomes and Taylor 1992) suggest that reversals occur regardless of compatibil-
ity biases.11 Here I focus on the theoretical reasons, since it is these reasons that make
Ross’s criticism unique. Ross (2005) disregards the compatibility hypothesis because
(he thinks) it depends on a classical computational model of the mind in assuming that
there are “facts of the matter about whether and how data are matched, as a distinct
processing step during computation” (p. 179) of information in the brain of the deci-
sion maker. Second, Ross argues that the compatibility hypothesis is unsatisfactory
because it is a non-economic explanation in the sense that it refers to evolutionarily
formed heuristics that minimize cognitive effort. I will consider the second reason
below, and postpone the discussion of the first until Sect. 6.
It might appear that Ross’s distinction between economic and evolutionary explana-
tions is not well-grounded in the first place because the explanation based on cognitive
effort-minimizing heuristics seems to use the same argument pattern or ‘hard core’
(optimization) as the economic explanation based on utility maximization.12 However,
there is an important difference between the two types of explanation: the maximi-
zation principle in economic explanations is just a mathematical way of representing
choice consistencies, whilst what is being consistently preferred, or what is being
maximized (e.g. profit, pleasure, and the like) is left open to be specified by different
auxiliary hypotheses; by contrast, the heuristic explanation is a substantial hypoth-
esis as to what is being maximized, namely, the probability of individuals’ survival
and reproduction. Margolis (2007) makes explicit this point in discussing ‘neglect
defaults’, another type of evolved heuristics that he proposes. He suggests that what
defines such heuristics “is not the economy of using them on particular occasions
(which is usually slight), but that the occasions for the default responses are so very
common. Without neglecting almost all such occasions by default, a person would be
overwhelmed by hesitations” (pp. 88–89), thereby lowering their chance of survival.
Since it is normally assumed that in economic choice contexts people are trying to
11 Although I do not discuss the empirical reason further in this study, I should note that many experi-
mental economists do not regard the compatibility hypothesis as the clearly superior account for empirical
reasons. In particular, resurgent interest in stochastic models for binary discrete choice under risk (see e.g.,
Wilkinson 2008, and his references on p. 200) seems to encourage this scepticism among experimental
economists.
12 I owe this point to Julian Reiss.
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maximize money, one needs to specify how these two auxiliary hypotheses (money
maximinzing and survival maximizing) are composed to constitute the ultimate drive
for choice behaviour. Ross can be interpreted as worrying (understandably) that such
an explanation necessarily involves ad hoc assumptions regarding how two causal
factors are composed to yield the final effect.
But, is this worry justified? To be sure, from the economic unificationist perspec-
tive the use of the evolutionary argument in explaining individual decision making is
a compromise to “a separate economic science”. However, even if one accepts unifi-
cation as an important ideal, one does not have to accept that the unification should be
achieved by the particular economic programme Ross promotes. In fact, I will later
suggest that there is a strong rival programme (see Sect. 5). Even if (and this is a
big if) Ross could show that his economic programme is more unifying than others
under some formal reconstruction of the current theories and evidence, this will not
be decisive since such a formulation is sensitive to new empirical evidence and theo-
retical developments. In sum, Ross’s methodological worry about the ad hocness of
the compatibility hypothesis (as he understands it) is subjectively understandable as
the worry of a defender of a separate economic science, but it is not justifiable.
Moreover, it turns out that the compatibility hypothesis is much more complex and
subtle than Ross assumes. Ross interprets the compatibility hypothesis as specifically
concerning a mechanism of mental computational processing. This is understandable
because Ross refers to Tversky and Thaler (1990), a review article which was written
for economists at the time that the compatibility hypothesis was further elaborated by
cognitive psychologists. The elaboration includes a discovery of two distinct causal
factors involved, and the following reformulation of the two hypotheses, the strategy
compatibility hypothesis, and the scale compatibility hypothesis. I will give a detailed
account of this elaboration in the next section, in order to show that Ross (2005) crit-
icism of the hypothesis is not only inaccurate but also neglects its rival programme,
which I will discuss in Sect. 5.
4 Decomposing the compatibility hypothesis
In this section, I will review the literature on the compatibility hypothesis in some
detail, in order to show that Ross’s criticism is largely misguided. In particular, the
compatibility hypothesis is decomposed into two distinct models, namely, the scale
compatibility hypothesis and the strategy compatibility hypothesis.
4.1 History
In one of the first studies of PRs, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973/2006) proposed the
hypothesis that “the compatibility or commensurability between a cue dimension
and the required response will affect the importance of the cue in determining the
response.” (pp. 75–76) The idea is based on the input-output model of human percep-
tion, information processing and cognition. According to this model, when a subject
receives some stimuli, these stimuli (input) are processed within the subject’s brain in
order to produce appropriate responses (output). Schematically put, this approach thus
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focuses on the mechanisms of either the selection of stimuli or the process of stimuli,
or both.13 We will shortly see that Slovic et al.’s studies concern both phases. ‘Com-
patibility’ or ‘commensurability’ is meant to capture the comparability, or similarity,
for the subject between the initial stimuli and the information used to make decisions,
although input (stimuli) and output (responses) are not necessarily comparable in the
objective sense (hence ‘compatibility’). In other words, compatibility concerns the
subjective perception of a relationship between options and tasks.
In the 1970s, parallel to his early work on PRs, Slovic was engaged in a separate
line of research investigating the difference between choice and matching responses
through the use of two-dimensional stimuli, such as batting averages vs. number of
home runs (where the task is to choose between baseball players), speed vs. accuracy
(where the task is to choose between typists), and so on. In four experiments, Slo-
vic (1975) asked his subjects first to match different pairs of options (making each
pair equal in subjective value), and then to choose between the matched options. He
found that the subjects did not choose randomly (as was predicted by the equality in
subjective value) but tended to select the option that was superior on the more impor-
tant dimension (in the abovementioned example batting average and typing accuracy,
respectively). Slovic’s (1975) judgement that a particular dimension is ‘more impor-
tant’ than the other is not based solely on the observation of which dimension weighted
more heavily in responses, which would make the statement that ‘people tend to select
the option that is superior on the more important dimension’ somewhat tautological.
Rather, he hypothesized in advance which dimension would be more important, based
on the estimation of how easily one could apply and justify the response; he also con-
firmed this hypothesis by interviewing the subjects ex post, asking for an explanation
of their choices.
Later, Tversky saw in this finding “the seeds of a general theory of response-mode
effects that had the potential to explain a wide variety of empirical findings, includ-
ing preference reversals” (Slovic 1995, p. 497), and jointly elaborated and tested this
theory in Tversky et al. (1988) and in Slovic et al. (1990). In the former, the authors
generalized Slovic’s (1995) hypothesis as the prominence hypothesis,14 which states
that the more prominent (important) attribute will loom larger in choice than in match-
ing. They further suggested that the prominence hypothesis might be interpreted as an
instance of a more general hypothesis, the principle of compatibility,15 which states
that the weight of a stimulus (input) attribute is enhanced by its compatibility with the
response (output) mode. The rationale of the latter is that the prominence hypothesis
indicates that qualitative considerations loom larger in the ordinal procedure of choice
than in the cardinal procedure of matching, which may be explained by the principle
of compatibility.
13 The final stage, namely, the production of responses does not seem to be an explicit subject matter of
this model. Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) expression theory explicitly models the production phase.
14 Originally, the hypothesis was somewhat clumsily labelled the “more important dimension hypothesis”
(Slovic 1975, p. 281).
15 Decision research psychologists tend to use ‘hypothesis’ and ‘principle’ (or ‘explanatory principle’)
interchangeably. See e.g., Tversky et al. (1990).
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The principle of compatibility as such, however, tells us little unless substantiated
by auxiliary hypotheses regarding what is (and what isn’t) compatible with what, so
here some homely example may be helpful:16 a kitchen stove usually has a square
array of four burners, with the knobs being linearly arrayed in front of the stove.
People often make mistakes regarding which knob to use in order to control, say,
the burner in the upper right corner of the square array. This type of mistake can be
reduced if the knobs are also squarely arrayed so that each knob is visually matched
to the corresponding burner (the upper right knob for the upper right stove, and so
on). In the latter arrangement, input stimuli (visual perceptions of the burners) and
output responses (controlling of the knobs) are compatible, while in the former they
are not, which explains the difference in performance in the two arrangements. This is
an example of compatibility in display. Extending from this simple and unproblematic
example, one can talk about compatibility in scale, semantic correspondence, and so
on. In each case, the hypothesized mechanism is twofold: at the first stage of the input-
output scheme, the compatibility between the stimulus attribute and the response mode
increases the availability of stimuli by priming or focusing attention on the compatible
features of the stimulus; then in the second phase, the compatibility increases (or the
lack thereof decreases) the computational ease of processing the stimuli, both phases
resulting in the enhanced weight of the compatible stimuli in responses.
In order to elaborate on the compatibility hypothesis, Slovic et al. (1990) designed
five experiments, two of which concerned the role of compatibility in prediction (of
market value [study 1] and academic performance [study 2]), and three concerned com-
patibility in preference (over monetary vs. nonmonetary outcomes [study 3], immedi-
ate vs. delayed payoffs [study 4] and by matching vs. pricing [study 5]). In particular
they were interested in ways in which the compatibility effect creates PRs in the latter
set of experiments. The study was partly motivated by their discovery of an asymmetry
in the PR data: PR was due mainly (more than 65% of all PRs. See Tversky et al. 1990,
p. 210) to the overpricing of low probability, high payoff bets, the so-called $-bets or
L-bets. From the compatibility principle, they inferred that the payoffs (which are
expressed in dollars) would be weighted more heavily in pricing (which is expressed
also in dollars) than in choice. Since the payoffs are much larger in the L bets than
in the H bets (high probability, low payoff bets), the compatibility effect seemed to
explain the overpricing of L bets, and thus the main cause of PRs. Although the results
of studies 3 and 4 of Slovic et al. (1990) were encouraging for this interpretation, they
encountered a surprise in study 5, in which they used a matching procedure to elicit
preferences: that is, they first required the subjects to fill in a missing value so as to
equate a pair of options, and then inferred their preference from the value they used.
This design made it possible to compare percentages of particular preferences across
four different elicitation procedures as shown in Table 1 for H  L.
In Table 1, the comparison between the results of choice and pricing shows the
familiar PR pattern: the subjects choose L bets but priced H bets higher (76 vs. 37%
by overall mean). In addition, the comparison between probability matching and payoff
16 This example is from Slovic et al. (1990, pp. 217–218). The authors are aware of the lack of an indepen-
dent procedure for assessing the compatibility between stimulus elements and response modes (pp. 218;
228), and resort to an unproblematic example such as the one I’m using here.
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Table 1 Percentage of responses favouring the H bet over the L bet for four different elicitation procedures
(from Slovic et al. 1990, p. 225)
(Task)/(Bets) Choice Probability
matching
Payoff
matching
Pricing
Small bets (H, L)
(35/36, $4), (11/36, $16) 80 79 54 29
(29/36, $2), (7/36, $9) 75 62 44 26
(34/36, $3), (18/36, $6.50) 73 76 70 39
(32/36, $4), (4/36, $40) 69 70 26 42
(34/36, $2.50), (14/36, $8.50) 71 80 43 22
(33/36, $2), (18/36, $5) 56 66 69 18
Mean 71 72 50 29
Large bets (H, L)
(35/36, $100), (11/36, $400) 88 76 69 65
(29/36, $50), (7/36, $225) 83 64 31 55
(34/36, $75), (18/36, $160) 77 79 65 55
(32/36, $100), (4/36, $1,000) 84 68 28 61
(34/36, $65), (14/36, $210) 78 80 36 57
(33/36, $50), (18/36, $125) 68 75 58 46
Mean 80 74 48 56
Overall mean 76 73 49 37
Note that apart from the direct choice task, these percentages are inferred from the probability and payoff
matches and stated prices
matching reveals what seems to be the result of the compatibility effect: probability
matching favours the H bets, whereas payoff matching favours the L bets (73 vs. 49%).
But what surprised the experimenters most was the comparison between choice and
matching. They reasoned that, if the compatibility effect was the sole cause, the prob-
ability matching would bias the responses in favour of the H bets and payoff matching
would bias the responses in favour of the L bets, relative to choice. For the choice
procedure was neutral with respect to the compatibility effect. They thus predicted
that the percentage of responses favouring the H bets would be ordered as:
%(probability matching) > %(choice) > %(payoff matching).
In fact, however, they observed:
76%(choice)  73%(probability matching) > 49%(payoff matching).
Slovic et al. (1990) explained this with the prominence hypothesis, according to which
the more prominent (important) attribute will loom larger in choice than in matching.
Tversky et al. (1988), who extensively investigated the prominence hypothesis, inter-
preted PRs as caused by the compatibility effect rather than the prominence effect,
because they ‘saw no a priori reason to hypothesize that probability is more important
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than money’ (Slovic et al. 1990, p. 226). But given the new result that the subjects
favoured the H bets in choice as much as (or sometimes even more than) in probability
matching, they reconsidered the possibility that PRs may be caused by the promi-
nence effect rather than (or in addition to) the compatibility effect. Their interpretation
that probability is the prominent dimension in risky choice is also supported by the
finding that the rating of bets is dominated by probability (see Slovic and Lichtenstein
1968; Goldstein and Einhorn 1987). From this perspective, the result in Table 1 can be
understood as the combination of two effects: “a compatibility effect that is responsi-
ble for the difference between probability matching and payoff matching (including
pricing), and a prominence effect that contributes to the relative attractiveness of H
bets in choice” (Slovic et al. 1990, p. 226).
4.2 Separating causes
The interpretation by Slovic et al. (1990) might appear a little confusing, since Tver-
sky et al. (1988) suggested that the prominence hypothesis “may be constructed as an
example of a more general principle of compatibility.” (p. 513) But how can a spe-
cial case (the prominence effect) occur in choice tasks separately and independently
from its general manifestation (the compatibility effect)? Fischer and Hawkins (1993)
clarify this confusion by explicitly distinguishing scale compatibility from strategy
compatibility. The former says that the “weight of any input component is enhanced
by its compatibility with the output” (Tversky et al. 1988, p. 513), the mechanism
behind this being that scale compatibility makes particular stimuli more accessible
and reduces the burden of computation. The latter states that “[q]ualitative preference
tasks are more likely than quantitative tasks to evoke a preference for the alternative
that is superior with respect to the most important attribute” (Fischer and Hawkins
1993, p. 583). This is presumably caused by the compatibility between the nature17
of the response task and the nature of the decision strategy it invokes, not by the com-
patibility between the units of payoff dimension of the stimuli and the units of the
response scale. The argument of the strategy compatibility hypothesis is as follows
(ibid.):
(St. 1) Quantitative response tasks evoke quantitative strategies in which the decision
maker makes trade-offs between value attributes.
(St. 2) Qualitative response tasks evoke multi-stage decision processes that involve
a mix of quantitative and qualitative strategies, with the latter being used to
resolve close decisions.
(St. 3) Qualitative strategies give primary consideration to differences with respect
to the prominent attribute.18
17 Fischer and Hawkins use the word ‘metaproperty’ instead of ‘nature’ presumably in order to indicate
that the two properties in question are not obvious to the experimenter: regarding the property of a response
task, what distinguishes quantitative from qualitative response tasks is unknown prior to empirical investi-
gation (in Experiment 2 they address this question; see p. 587); regarding the property of a decision strategy,
it is even less obvious which task evokes which strategy.
18 Fischer and Hawkins note that (St. 3) holds only if we assume the use of particular qualitative strategies,
such as lexicographic ordering or elimination by aspects. For example, if a qualitative strategy involved is a
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(St. 4) Qualitative tasks are more likely than quantitative tasks to lead to a prefer-
ence for the alternative that is superior with respect to the prominent attribute
(strategy compatibility hypothesis).
Thus stated, the strategy compatibility hypothesis turns out to be a generalized
version of the prominence hypothesis; it generalizes choice-matching comparison to
include any comparison of a qualitative and quantitative preference task. Compare this
with the argument of the scale compatibility hypothesis:
(Sc. 1) A response mode primes or focuses attention on the compatible features of
the stimulus.
(Sc. 2) Compatibility (non compatibility) between the input and the output scale
requires less (more) mental operations, often decreasing (increasing) effort
and error.
(Sc. 3) The weight of a stimulus attribute is enhanced by its compatibility with the
response mode (scale compatibility hypothesis).
This input-output compatibility can be applied not only to scale (e.g., dollar ⇒
pricing in dollars), but also to other dimensions, that is, the notion of compatibility
can be extended to the nature of the information and the nature of the task (e.g., ordinal
info ⇒ ordering, common features ⇒ similarity judgement) in general. Now it should
be clear, however, that strategy compatibility is not generalizable to this hypothesis,
since the compatibility of the former concerns different things, i.e., response tasks and
decision strategies. The two are thus distinct hypotheses. It is therefore conceivable
that they imply opposite predictions. For instance, in choice and matching tasks involv-
ing jobs with two dimensions (salary and vacation time), the strategy compatibility
hypothesis predicts that the prominent dimension (i.e., salary in this case) looms larger
in choice than in matching tasks. On the contrary, the scale compatibility hypothesis
predicts that salary will be weighted more heavily in dollar-matching tasks than in
choice. Based on this insight Fischer and Hawkins (1993) designed four experiments
to detect the strategy compatibility effect and the scale compatibility effect separately
(in riskless choice), and observed that the strategy compatibility effect is much larger
than the scale compatibility effect.
This is not the end of the story: some anomalies persist, as is often the case in
experimental science. For example, Fischer and Hawkins (1993) note a further puzzle,
namely that in a study of risky choice by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), attractive-
ness rating tasks evoked stronger preference for H (high-probability, low-payoff) bets
than choice did, a phenomenon that neither the scale-compatibility hypothesis nor the
strategy-compatibility hypothesis (nor a combination of the two) predict. But the point
should be clear by now: the compatibility hypothesis is a causal hypothesis, and two
distinct causal mechanisms have been identified.
conjunctive rule (in which one eliminates any option that falls below one’s aspiration level on any attribute),
(St. 3) does not necessarily hold.
123
Synthese (2013) 190:2267–2289 2283
5 The procedural approach
The discussion in the previous section makes it clear that the strategy compatibility
hypothesis, distinguished from the scale compatibility hypothesis, does not presup-
pose any specific computational model of the human mind. While scale compatibility
biases presumably take place in order to minimize computational cost (Sc. 2), strategy
compatibility biases are neutral with regard to the presumption of such a mechanism.
Although the first premise of the strategic compatibility hypothesis (St. 1) says that
quantitative response tasks evoke quantitative strategies, the use of quantitative strate-
gies is not necessarily minimizing computational costs; in fact, quantitative strategies
(e.g., maximizing profit) can sometimes require more mental efforts than qualitative
ones. The fact that quantitative tasks evoke quantitative strategies may be explained by
some other causes such as framing. Regarding this point, there is a highly suggestive
study by Rubinstein (2006), who conducted a set of questionnaire-based experiments
to investigate the effects of economic education on people’s decision making. In the
experiments the subjects were asked to make a decision, as a CEO of a company, on
how many employees they were willing to maintain in order to increase profit. The
subjects were presented a table of seven combinations of numbers of workers who
would continue to be employed and the resulting profits of the company, and asked to
decide upon the number of employees they were willing to continue to employ. The
table was constructed in such a way that there was a trade-off between employee pro-
tection (reducing a number of layoffs) and profit maximization, as is typically the case
in recession phases. Rubinstein found that the group of economics students tended
to prioritize profit maximization (45–49% choosing the profit-maximizing number,
100), while other groups sacrificed profit maximization to a varying extent in order to
reduce the number of employees who would be fired (only 13–16% of philosophy and
mathematics students choosing the profit-maximizing 100). Interestingly, this varia-
tion among different groups disappeared once the table showing various results was
replaced by a formula (profit function) which yields similar values to those presented
in the table: in this condition, a similar proportion of subjects (73–77%) regardless
of their educational backgrounds chose the profit maximizing value, 100. This result
can be interpreted as an example of strategy compatibility biases, where, although
the response task is identical (i.e., deciding how many workers to keep), different
ways of framing the similar information (table vs. formula) induce different response
strategies (choosing from multiple alternatives vs. solving an equation), resulting in
different decisions. It seems that the prominent attribute for economics students in
this choice is profit, while for non-economics students employee protection also mat-
ters. But the majority of non-economics students, who balanced between conflicting
goals (employee protection vs. profit-maximization) in the ‘table’ condition, seemed to
have paid less attention to this conflict in the ‘formula’ condition. Instead, they simply
solved the equation to yield the profit-maximizing number of employees. Computa-
tional economy does not explain this shift of response strategy because solving the
equation is not computationally easier than choosing a value from the table. In the
‘table’ condition, the subjects only had to identify the maximum profit on the table,
and then see the corresponding number of employees. In the ‘formula’ condition, by
contrast, subjects had to compute the profit-maximizing number of employees (x)
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based on the function ‘2
√
x − 0.1x − 8’. Note that in both conditions it was explicitly
stated that profits would still be positive even if no workers were laid off.
Nor can the shift be explained by the differences in training, since there was no
significant variation among different groups of students. Although an economics edu-
cation seems to influence what dimension one sees as prominent in choice options,
this effect ceases to be significant once the quantitative strategy (i.e., solving the equa-
tion) is primed by manipulating the presentation of the relevant information. These
findings suggest that strategy compatibility effects can be quite powerful, regardless
of considerations of computational costs.
A second thing to note is that the scale compatibility and the strategy compati-
bility hypotheses are not presumed to be mutually exclusive rival hypotheses, but are
expected to capture two different causally relevant mechanisms underlying preference
reversals. As in this case, psychological models typically presuppose that a particu-
lar phenomenon results from compound causes of heterogeneous natures. This fact
refutes Ross’s allegation that the compatibility hypothesis is based on the old-fash-
ioned computational model of human minds. On the contrary, it may be argued that
psychological models are relatively ‘liberal’ in allowing for diverse theoretical pre-
suppositions, making a sharp contrast with the standard economic models committed
to some form of utility maximization. Criticizing psychological models because of
their presumed rigid theoretical commitments is not well grounded.
Contrary to Ross’s suggestion, the strategy compatibility hypothesis in fact reflects
two different traditions in research on decision making, namely, the reason-based and
value-based approaches (see Shafir et al. 1993). Value-based models (such as EUT
and Prospect Theory) model individual choice as a maximization of utility which an
individual assigns to different objects of choice based on her intrinsic preference. By
contrast, reason-based models model individual choice as a result of certain inferential
processes. Choosing an option that is more valued with respect to a prominent attri-
bute (e.g., salary as opposed to the number of holidays, when choosing a job) from
two equally valued options is an example of a reason-based decision. In the strategy
compatibility hypothesis, quantitative strategies correspond to value-based models,
while qualitative strategies are better captured by reason-based models. These two
approaches are not mutually exclusive, but are meant to capture two different types of
mechanism both involved in decision-making processes.
Should such a ‘liberal’ approach be condemned because it lacks a unifying theo-
retical framework? Not necessarily: first, the strategy compatibility hypothesis is not
a mere conjunction of two types of decision process model, but rather it concerns
perceptual or cognitive mechanisms through which different processes (i.e., reason-
based and value-based decision strategies) are evoked depending on the nature of the
task. In other words, the hypothesis not only identifies two types of mechanism, but
also purports to identify the conditions under which these mechanisms are triggered.
Second, although the value-based approach is theoretically much more sophisticated,
some theorists have started to provide a formal and unifying framework for the reason-
based approach. Gold and List (2004) have recently proposed a formal framework that
unifies the compatibility effects and framing effects. According to this framework, the
violations of both types of invariance—procedure invariance associated with compat-
ibility effects and description invariance associated with framing effects—take place
123
Synthese (2013) 190:2267–2289 2285
because the agent considers a set of implicitly inconsistent propositions (the logical
condition) along different decision paths that lead to mutually inconsistent decisions
(the empirical condition). I shall refer to this model as the procedural model, but as
Gold and List (2004) point out, what the ‘procedure’ exactly refers to is open to sev-
eral interpretations of the empirical conditions (e.g., Does an agent consider different
propositions in different temporal orders? Or does she weigh those propositions differ-
ently? Or are some propositions more focal than others for the agent?).19 Rubinstein
(2003) proposes a similar procedural model in the domain of inter-temporal decision
making, claiming that the procedural model is empirically superior to and more intu-
itive than the hyperbolic discount models (see Sect. 2.2 above for details) that are
popular among behavioural economists. Although relatively new in economics, the
procedural approach may have the potential to explain both inter- and intra-temporal
inconsistencies of choice. The compatibility hypothesis laid the basis of this line of
research, by providing detailed psychological mechanisms. One cannot therefore crit-
icize the compatibility hypothesis as ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic,’ as Ross (2005) does: the
hypothesis does more than “systematically summarizing data”, and if taken seriously
as an explanation, it points to a rather different theoretical possibility (the procedural
model) from the one Ross envisages (the multiple-self model).
6 Can ‘wider theoretical considerations’ help?
I have defended the compatibility hypothesis against the criticisms that it is based on
a misguided theoretical framework and that it is based on no theoretical framework at
all. Now I turn to Ross’s other claim that the latest neuroscientific research, and the
model of the mind supported by it, favour the multiple-agent model. I will show that
this is not so, and why.
In criticizing Slovic et al.’s compatibility hypothesis, Ross (2005, pp. 233, 235)
makes a suggestive contrast between the “classical model of the mind” and the new
model which indicates that human brains are “parallel information processors”. The
idea seems to be that no centralized process takes place in the brain when the decision
maker is considering some choice problem; instead, various parts of the brain process
information in various ways without having the Cartesian ‘central processer’. This
idea seems congenial to Ross’s hypothesis that a decision maker consists of several
economic agents, each doing its own maximization based on different preferences. The
contrast seems to be that in the classical model a computer-like algorithm is performed
by the unitary decision maker, while in the model informed by cognitive neuroscience
the decision-making processes are ‘decentralized’.
Now, assume for the sake of argument that such ‘decentralized’ model of the mind
is supported by neuroscientific or some other wider (non-behavioural) evidence. This
would not favour Ross’s multiple-self model relative to the procedural model. Note
first that the strategy compatibility hypothesis is also consistent with this new picture
of the mind. As I suggested above, it is an open question how a ‘decision path’ should
19 Starmer (2000, p. 35) defines ‘procedural theories’ as the theories that try to model the psychological
processes that lead to choice. Note that how such ‘processes’ are interpreted is left open under this definition.
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be interpreted; Gold and List (2004, p. 260) define a decision path as “the order in
which the agent considers the propositions in a sequential decision process”, but sug-
gest that several empirical interpretations are possible: if we interpret a decision path
actually taken by the agent as a set of the propositions which are considered weight-
ier, or more focal, than are other propositions, then the hypothesis will be consistent
with the fact that different parts of the brain process information in a parallel way.
But even if a decision path is literally interpreted as a temporal order, the hypothesis
may be consistent with the decentralized processing model, which is compatible with
the idea that different parts of the brain are ‘taking turns’, as in a sequential game
between different selves. These considerations suggest that the procedural model and
the multiple-agent model are both compatible with the decentralized model of the
mind.
Moreover, the multiple-agent model and the procedural model may be mutually
compatible (Harrison 2008, p. 337). Recall that the procedural model consists of two
conditions, logical and empirical. The former is a requirement that different deci-
sion paths lead to different final decisions on the target proposition. Gold and List
(2004) explicate this by claiming that an agent’s initial dispositions must be implicitly
inconsistent for this ‘path dependence’ to happen. An agent’s initial dispositions are
implicitly inconsistent with respect to a proposition ϕ in a set X if there exist two
logically inconsistent sets of propositions 1 and 2 such that the agent has dispo-
sitions to accept all propositions in 1 and all propositions in 2, but 1 entails ϕ
and 2 entails ¬ϕ. Implicit inconsistencies can happen in two ways. First, when the
agent violates deductive closure, i.e., when there exists a logically consistent set of
propositions  such that the agent has dispositions to accept all propositions in , 
entails ϕ, and yet the agent has no disposition to accept ϕ. For example, suppose that
the agent has initial dispositions to accept P and (P ⇒ Q), but for some reason she
also has a disposition to accept ¬Q. The set {P, (P ⇒ Q)} entails Q but the set {¬Q}
(trivially) entails ¬Q, meaning that the agent’s initial dispositions are implicitly incon-
sistent. Second, an implicit inconsistency occurs whenever the agent’s disposition is
explicitly inconsistent, i.e., when the agent has dispositions to accept both ϕ and ¬ϕ
simultaneously. Although Gold and List suggest that path dependence occurs mainly
because deductive closure is violated, they do not exclude the possibility that the agent
is explicitly inconsistent with regard to the decision on the target proposition. In this
case, one way to interpret the underlying psychology is to suppose that the individ-
ual has mutually contradicting dispositions, one accepting and the other rejecting the
target proposition. This interpretation is consistent with the idea that the individual
really consists of more than one agent, each characterized by its own distinct set of
preferences. In this sense, the procedural model is compatible with the multiple-agent
model.20 The upshot is that, because both are compatible with the decentralized model
20 Ross has recently argued for the similar but more general view that the personal and sub-personal level
models may be neither mutually exclusive (i.e., both can provide genuine explanations) nor reductive (i.e.,
the former is not necessarily reducible to the latter) because the two models concern “distinct scales of reso-
lution” on the actual causal processes (Ross et al. 2008; Ross 2009). On this view, my following evaluation
of the procedural and multiple-agent models regards relative explanatory merits of the two models rather
than their absolute proximity to the true explanation.
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of the mind that Ross advocates, and because both may be interpreted as compatible
with each other in the sense explicated above, neither the decentralized model of the
mind, nor neuroscientific studies purported to support it, can lend any support to one
over the other model.
There is, however, a respect in which the procedural model is superior to the
multiple-agent model. On the one hand, the multiple-agent model presupposes a
game-like interaction among different agents in determining the final decision as an
equilibrium (or equilibria). On the other, the procedural model presupposes certain
cognitive or perceptual mechanisms through which one decision path rather than oth-
ers is taken, depending on how problems are described or how decisions are elicited.
One of the empirical conditions is explicated by the strategy compatibility hypothesis.
These mechanisms are presumed to capture ways in which individuals change their
responses to extensionally equivalent decision problems depending on descriptions of
the problem and procedures of preference elicitation. By contrast, the multiple-agent
model alone cannot explain these framing and elicitation effects. This, of course, is
not the case if a multiple-agent model is coupled with some model of framing at the
whole-person level. If the decision at the whole-person level derives solely from games
among the agents within an individual, how could framing at the whole-person level
matter? In sum, although the multiple-agent model has some intuitive and empirical
appeal in the domain of inter-temporal decision making, the procedural models, in
particular the strategy compatibility hypothesis, can better explain anomalies in the
domain of intra-temporal decision making.
7 Conclusion
In this study, I have examined a debate on possible explanations of preference reversals
(the multiple-agent model vs. the procedural model), and suggested that this particular
debate cannot be resolved simply by appealing to a methodological criterion of theory
appraisal (such as unification). Specifically, I have criticized Ross’s (2005) claim that
the compatibility hypothesis proposed by psychologists and behavioural economists
is ad hoc. I have first distinguished three cases of ad hocness, based on Lakatos (1970)
framework of research programme. Second, I have motivated Ross’s critique by illus-
trating how the Lakatosian framework works in the domain of inter-temporal choice,
and potentially also in the domain of intra-temporal choice. Third, I have argued that
Ross’s critique of the compatibility hypothesis as ‘Ptolemaic’ is unjustified, by show-
ing that the hypothesis consists of two distinct causal hypotheses regarding cognitive
processes underlying decision making. I have also suggested that the compatibility
hypothesis is based on a well-motivated theoretical framework, i.e., the reason-based,
procedural approach. These considerations suggest that the real issue of the debate is
not methodological but empirical. Further, I have shown that this empirical debate is
not easily resolved by appeal to wider theoretical considerations such as what the true
model of the mind is.
Finally, it must be noted that, although I have been more sympathetic towards the
procedural model than towards the multiple-self model, the scope of my examina-
tion is rather limited; it does not exclude the possibility of a better formulation of
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a multiple-self model that explains the data better than any procedural models do.
This is an entirely empirical issue. Also, my exercise does not deny the usefulness
of unification as a criterion of theory appraisal in general; rather it shows its limited
applicability in this specific debate. Still I believe this exercise to be useful. For after
all, a general, abstract epistemic rule must be used in and evaluated against specific,
concrete cases. My attempt in this study has been to present one such concrete case.
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